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Abstract For reliable detection of explosives, a combination of methods inte-
grated within a single measurement platform may increase detection performance.
However, the efficient field testing of such measurement platforms requires the use
of inexplosive simulants that are detectable by a wide range of methods. Physical
parameters such as simulant density, elemental composition and crystalline struc-
ture must closely match those of the target explosive. The highly discriminating
bulk detection characteristics of nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) especially
constrain simulant design. This paper describes the development of an inexplosive
RDX simulant suited to a wide range of measurement methods, including NQR.
Measurements are presented that confirm an RDX NQR response from the simulant.
The potential use of the simulant for field testing a prototype handheld NQR-based
RDX detector is analyzed. Only modest changes in prototype operation during field
testing would be required to account for the use of simulant rather than real
explosive.
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The detection of explosives during security checks of persons, luggage, consignments,
vehicles, etc. is a very difficult task. This is especially true in the case of technically
masked improvised explosive devices. A combination of physical methods may be
necessary for reliable detection. Testing of instruments for correct system function-
ality and sensitivity may therefore require material compatible with detection by
multiple methods. The response characteristics of the material must also allow for
relevant detection scenarios useful for training security personnel. However, in many
cases it is not desirable or even possible to use real explosives for testing. Instead, an
inert material must be used to simulate the actual physical characteristics of an
explosive material that are crucial for detection and identification.
Certain kinds of simulants are used to test security systems, but for some methods of
detection there are no suitable simulants available. Moreover, each of the existing
simulants are either specific only for one method, or at a maximum for one small group
of detection methods. They include inert materials for visual and tactile recognition,
X-ray methods involving dual energy [backscatter and computer tomography (CT)],
nuclear methods such as neutron activation of gamma rays and samples of substances
for trace particles detection with devices or dogs. Research on an RDX simulant for
nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) has also been previously conducted [1].
However, for advanced measurement platforms in real security testing applications, a
simulant has to satisfy the requirements of a combination of detection methods based
on different physical principles. Therefore, it is necessary to develop substances that
cannot explode and simultaneously simulate real explosives with the maximum
number of physical characteristics crucial for their detection. The development of a
universal simulant is particularly complicated with regard to bulk detection methods
where the signal depends on the chemical bonds in the search target explosive. Such
methods include X-ray diffraction, NQR and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR).
These methods in principle have very small probability of false positive alarms, but
only NQR seems suitable, for practical reasons, to search for plastic explosives on
persons. It is therefore of special interest to explore the NQR characteristics of a
universal RDX plastic explosive simulant.
2 Methods used in the Detection of Explosives
In the first phase of the research, it was necessary to carry out a detailed theoretical
analysis of the physical interactions underlying the bulk and trace methods of explosives
detection. The following section briefly describes the relevant physical parameters that
impact on simulant design, for methods currently exploited in existing devices or
proposed methods for checking of persons, luggage, consignments and vehicles.
2.1 X-Ray Methods
X-ray machines are the most widely deployed devices for security checking.
Besides simple absorption of X-ray radiation, the devices also employ the methods
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of backscattering (Compton scattering), dual (multi) energy (of X-ray photons), CT
and X-ray diffraction. At airports, there are automatic explosive detection systems
based on the last three physical principles.
X-ray machines with dual (multi) energy scan two (more) X-ray images of the
controlled object from the same angle, but for different wavelengths of X-ray
radiation. They use the fact that the coefficient of absorption also depends on the
wavelength of X-ray radiation. The intensity of X-ray radiation of the first
wavelength upon transmission through a controlled object with thickness d is
I1 ¼ I01el1d, where I01 is the initial intensity and l1 the attenuation coefficient.
Similarly for the second wavelength, I2 ¼ I02el2d. Therefore, l1/l2 = ln (I01/I1)/ln
(I02/I2), and it is evident that there is no dependence on the thickness of the material
of the controlled object. Furthermore, the ratio l1/l2 depends on the effective proton
number Zeff of the material of the controlled object. The essential relevant point for
simulant design is that Zeff is approximately proportional to the product of density
and average proton number Z. It means that the simulant should have similar density
and average proton number as the original explosive.
Security X-ray machines with CT scan X-ray images of the object from different
directions and these images are then mutually computed. On the basis of this
comparison, the absorption of X-ray radiation in any elementary region of the
examined object can be determined. The region may be assigned a material mass
density. Explosives are then detected simply on the basis of their CT density.
Therefore, the simulant should have similar density and average proton number as
the original explosive.
X-ray diffraction (XRD) imposes different constraints on simulant design. In
X-ray diffraction, an incident X-ray of a particular wavelength is diffracted by the
crystalline phase of the specimen according to Bragg’s law. A given crystal
structure corresponds to a distinctive diffraction pattern. For some crystalline
materials, it is sometimes possible to obtain isomorphic structures (similar
crystalline lattice parameters but with different atom scatterers, as occurs in some
mineral families with different levels of atom substitution). Such isomorphic
structures may result in similarities in the main diffraction peaks. However,
crystalline explosives would seem unlikely to allow this possibility because of the
difficulty in finding suitable atom substitutions. Therefore, for XRD detection the
simulant should have a significant content of RDX.
2.2 Neutron Methods
In recent years, there has been promising development of methods using neutron
radiation for explosives detection. The simplest of them, neutron backscattering,
involves irradiating the controlled object by a beam of fast neutrons followed by
thermalized neutron detection, i.e., the neutrons slowed down by the nuclei of
hydrogen or other light atoms. More advanced methods include neutron in–gamma
out methods such as thermal neutron analysis (TNA), fast neutron analysis (FNA),
pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA), pulsed fast-thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA)
and nanosecond neutron analysis/associated particles imaging (NNA/API). These
methods are based on the irradiation of a controlled object (luggage) by a beam of
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neutrons with the subsequent detection of gamma radiation as a product of the
interaction of neutrons with nuclei of chemical elements contained in the controlled
object. Each chemical element produces characteristic gamma radiation. Consid-
ering these neutron methods, the simulant will present as the original explosive as
long as it contains basic elements, i.e., carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and hydrogen, with
the same mutual ratio as in the actual explosive.
There also exist systems exploiting the simultaneous measurement of transmitted
fast neutrons and X-rays [2] through material. These are examples of an advanced
detection system based on two different underlying methods. In this case, the
simulant must satisfy the constraints imposed by both X-ray and neutron
measurement mentioned above.
2.3 Trace Particle Detection
Currently, trace particle detectors are widely deployed for security checking of
persons, luggage, consignments or vehicles. These detectors take samples by
vacuuming vapors from the vicinity of the controlled object or by wiping its surface.
The analysis process itself may involve ion mobility spectroscopy (IMS), various
combinations of (dual) gas chromatography (DGC), preselection by a semiperme-
able membrane, various preconcentrations on special surfaces, electron capture
detection (ECD), mass spectrometry (MS) or biodetection, etc. The devices are not
configured to detect inexplosive components of explosives such as binders, dyes,
etc.1 They always detect the presence of the energetic components of explosives.
Based on these considerations, the inert simulant must contain at least a small
amount of the explosive component if it is to present as the original explosive.
Regarding trace particle detection by dogs, the substances that are included in the
simulant should not have a strong smell [3].
2.4 Millimeter Wave Imaging
Passive and especially active millimeter wave imaging systems are used for body
scanners. These methods rely on measuring changes in millimeter wave reflectivity
due to variations in dielectric constant and electromagnetic loss tangent of the
material. Contrast in images may be obtained between human skin and other objects
because of differences in the electromagnetic parameters. Very high resolution
imaging through thin dielectric layers like clothing is possible. Many liquids and
lossy materials provide high contrast. However, the selectivity for two different
types of materials with similar electromagnetic parameters may be limited. Simulant
characteristics relating to this measurement method were not considered explicitly
in this study. However, it is reasonable to assume that a bulk volume of simulant
material will behave similarly to the corresponding explosive. This is because
explosives, binders and other materials potentially suited to simulant preparation
1 The devices are not configured to detect inexplosive components of explosives except for detection of
2,3-dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane (DMNB) and para-mononitritoluene (p-MNT). The DMNB and p-MNT
are marking agents specified in the Technical Annex of Montreal Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.
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have broadly similar dielectric characteristics (relatively low dielectric constant and
loss tangent).
2.5 Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance
NQR involves detection of spin resonances in the radiofrequency spectral range.
The resonant frequencies are highly dependent on the electronic coordination
around a given nucleus. For 14N nuclei in explosives, the resonances generally occur
below 6MHz, with spectral widths of tens of hertz up to a few kilohertz [4, 5]. It
may be argued that for explosives detection, the NQR method yields possibly the
highest specificity of all considered methods. Just like the XRD method, it is
difficult to replicate the NQR response using other substances. Therefore, the
simulant should have a sufficient content of RDX with regard to NQR measurement.
What is more, the preparation method must not lead to excessive broadening of the
resonance due to even subtle changes in the electric field gradient distribution in the
vicinity of the target nuclei.
NMR has also been proposed for explosives detection [6]. The measurement of
characteristic 1H NMR decay times in liquid or crystalline solid explosives may
facilitate specific detection. NMR decay times in liquids are generally much longer
than in solids. It is therefore unlikely that a solid simulant developed for NQR
would be suitable for testing NMR methods configured for liquid explosive
detection. However for the case of NMR measurement of solid explosives, a
simulant developed for NQR would be suitable to the extent of providing a
significant NMR response with exactly the same decay characteristics as the actual
explosive. The 1H response from the inert materials in the simulant may also
contribute response components with short decay times.
3 The Proposal for an Inert Simulant
On the basis of the analysis of underlying physical interactions used for explosives
detection, the individual methods were grouped into two sets according to the
demands made on the composition of the simulant (see Tables 1, 2). Table 1
includes cases where required physical parameters may be met by the use of inert
material only, while Table 2 includes cases where the energetic material (original
explosive) must be mixed with the inert material.
Most of these requirements were realizable within an adequate accuracy if the
simulants were prepared according to the following procedure: firstly, to propose a
composition of basic inert mass with proportional content of basic elements N, O, C
and H that correspond most favorably to the original explosive. Then, after verifying
the required characteristics of the basic inert mass, experiments were performed to
confirm the maximum inexplosive concentration of RDX to be mixed with the basic
inert mass.
Several tens of organic compounds were considered for the preparation of
samples. Especially, oxalic acid and its salts appeared suitable for this purpose.
Unfortunately, these compounds are chemically aggressive or, from the physical
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point of view, are absolutely incompatible with bonding systems of plastic
explosives. A mixture of cyanuric acid, tetrazole (guanidine azo), CMC (carboxy
methyl cellulose), water and glycol have been found suitable.
The maximum guaranteed inexplosive concentration of RDX in the mixture with
basic inert mass was experimentally stated at 20 %. The Czech certified Safety
Engineering Laboratory of the Research Institute for Industrial Chemistry, Explosia
a.s. performed sensitivity tests according to the international certified procedures
[3]. The tests included mechanical sensitivity with respect to shock, the test of
mechanical sensitivity with respect to friction and the test of thermal sensitivity. The
simulant was not sensitive in any case. In terms of safe international transportation,
the Czech Proof House for Arms and Ammunition classified the simulant as 4.1
material (flammable solids, self-reactive substances and solid desensitized explo-
sives). The 20 % RDX content is actually about the maximum limit also because the
other components of the universal simulant must have the same ratio of chemical
elements N, O, C and H like the real plastic explosive. This constraint requires a
Table 1 Group of explosives detection methods which require a simulant realized using a basic inert
mass only
Group of explosives detection methods Required physical characteristics
X-ray absorption and backscattering (simple absorption,
backscattering—Compton scattering, automatic
explosives detection by double (multi) energy (from
one and more angles of view), CT computer
tomography)
Corresponding effective proton number
It would be also met with the corresponding
proportional representation of elements
(N, O, C, H)
TNA—Thermalized neutron detection Higher amount of hydrogen atoms
Neutron in–gamma out methods (TNA—thermal neutron
analysis, FNA—fast neutron analysis, PFNA—pulsed
fast neutron analysis, NNA/API—nanosecond neutron
analysis/associated particle interrogation)
Corresponding proportional representation
of elements (N, O, C, H)
Table 2 Group of explosives detection methods which require a simulant realized by a mixture of basic
inert mass with an inexplosive concentration of RDX component
Group of explosives detection methods Required physical characteristics
Trace particles detection (IMS—ion mobility
spectrometry, GC—gas chromatography, ECD—
electron capture detection, MS—mass spectrometry,
etc.)
Presence of a small amount of the original
explosive component (RDX in this case)
Optical standoff methods (Raman spectrometry,
terahertz spectrometry, LIBS—laser induced
breakdown spectrometry, etc.)
Presence of a detectable amount of the original
explosive component (RDX)
Magnetic resonance (NQR, NMR) Presence of a larger (detectable) amount of the
original explosive component (RDX)
X-ray diffraction (XRD) Presence of a larger (detectable) amount of the
original explosive component (RDX)
572 J. Turecek et al.
123
higher oxygen content and places a severe limitation on the search for binder
material with better desensitizing properties.
The comparison of the density and N, O, C, H elemental composition for the
basic inert mass, the final simulant and actual RDX-based explosive is presented in
Table 3. The concentrations of C, H, N and O were measured by an automatic
elemental analyzer (EA 1108 Fisons at Elemental Analysis Service, Department of
Organic Chemistry, Faculty of Chemical Technology, The University of Pardubice).
Regarding the elemental composition ratios, it should be noted that different
types of RDX-based explosives have variations in composition, according to
manufacturing process. There is therefore no exact prescription for the elemental
ratios and densities required of a simulant. Rather, common RDX-based explosives
have elemental ratios that fall within a relatively narrow range of concentrations. It
is sufficient if the measured difference between the simulant and the original
explosives is similar to the difference between the common RDX based explosives
themselves. Moreover, the detection of explosives is complicated in practice by the
presence of materials surrounding the controlled object. It is therefore unlikely that
small variations in simulant elemental composition compared to a given RDX-based
explosive target would lead to significant changes in detection efficiency for
equipment under test.
As a first step in evaluating the detection characteristics of the simulant, a sample
of the simulant was submitted for NQR measurement. As discussed above, the NQR
response is probably the most difficult to mimic in a simulant. The aim of the
measurements was to firstly confirm detection of a useable NQR response from the
simulant material, and secondly to consider limitations imposed by differences in
sensitivity between the simulant and actual explosives. These measurements are
described in the next section.
4 Simulant NQR Measurements
The CSIRO is developing a prototype handheld probe for personnel scanning based
on NQR [7]. For comprehensive characterization of system performance, the probe
needs to be tested in real-world environments on actual human subjects under a
variety of conditions. Due to health and safety concerns, the carriage and handling
procedures for explosives are restrictive, and this may limit the scope of testing. A
suitable simulant would provide the convenience of relaxing the operational
constraints associated with field testing.
Table 3 Comparison of density and N, O, C and H elemental composition for the basic inert mass, the
final simulant and original explosives of the hexogen type
Density (g cm-3) N (mass %) O (mass %) C (mass %) H (mass %)
Basic inert mass 1.51 30.4 40.1 24.5 5.0
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The NQR measurement poses a difficulty for simulant preparation because of the
high discrimination of the technique afforded by narrow radiofrequency resonances,
together with the fact the method requires bulk mass for detection. For a given 14N
NQR, target spectral interference due to other materials is usually rare. The
available magnetic resonance literature suggests it is difficult to find two substances
having closely matched resonant frequencies and spin decay times. Previously,
CSIRO has used the 3.6 or 4.64 MHz lines in sodium nitrite (NaNO2) [8] as a
substitute for RDX resonances. However, from a systems testing point of view, the
frequency difference of the two materials is significant enough to be problematic for
extrapolation of system performance to the RDX resonant frequency (5.192 MHz).
This is because most NQR systems are configured for narrow band transmission and
detection. Also different magnetization decay times lead to the requirement for
differing pulse sequences for optimum performance for each material. Sodium
nitrite has the additional property of strong piezoelectric response, and we have
found that mechanical treatment of some sodium nitrite samples (shaking of
samples and thermal shocks, even for samples potted in paraffin wax or finely
ground) can cause noticeable changes in response. The use of a simulant containing
RDX would remove uncertainties in systems testing. It would also be of benefit if
the simulant were suitable for other methods besides NQR, especially for cases
where multiple methods are assessed simultaneously, either separately or as part of
multi-sensor integrated systems.
To characterize the RDX, simulant response measurements were compared to
two other samples containing RDX: (i) a sample of PE4 with nominal RDX content
of 87 %, phlegmatized with lithium stearate grease, paraffin and pentaerythrytol
dioleate and (ii) a sample of Primasheet 2000, a flexible sheet explosive (3 mm
thickness) composed of 88 % RDX (nominal), with the remainder mostly composed
of polyisobutylene, other plasticisers (sebecates/adipates) and Teflon. Each of the
PE4 and simulant (100.0 g samples) were pressed by hand into the shape of a disc at
the bottom of identical cylindrical plastic containers. The resulting discs had
thicknesses of approximately 1 cm and diameter 9.5 cm. It was found during this
process that the simulant was less malleable than PE4. For the Primasheet sample,
two oblong sections of sheet, each with edge lengths 9.5 9 11 cm, were stacked on
top of each other. The total Primasheet mass was 106.0 g.
The measurements were performed using the CSIRO prototype handheld NQR
personnel scanning prototype, configured for the detection of the RDX 14N
resonance at 5.192 MHz. The prototype consists of a coil set arranged to provide a
high level of radio frequency interference suppression. The suppression level is such
that in typical open environments, the total NQR receiver noise is dominated by the
thermal noise in the coil set. The measurements reported here were performed in an
unshielded environment. The active aperture of the coil set is a circle with diameter
approximately 10 cm. Therefore, the differences in the sample spatial distribution
between Primasheet and the other plasticised RDX samples described above
should not have a large effect on the relative responses.
To determine response parameters of each sample at high signal to noise ratio,
the samples were fixed in a position adjacent to the active probe aperture at a
standoff distance of 3 cm. Figure 1 shows the measurement configuration. In
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addition, the dwell time for measurement was extended considerably compared to
normal prototype operation, so as to allow the averaging of 4,096 waveforms. The
pulse width was 150 ls, with a 450 ls delay applied between the end of the pulse
and the beginning of data acquisition. The pulse repetition period s was 64 ms, long
enough to allow magnetization recovery and decouple the response of successive
pulses, i.e., no steady state or echo component is expected, since T1 (the spin–lattice
relaxation time) is significantly shorter than the pulse repetition period. This was
confirmed by noting that no change occurred in the observed amplitudes after
increasing the pulse repetition rate by a factor of two.
Figure 2 shows the free induction decay magnitude for the three tested samples,
normalized to the case of PE4. Exponential fits to the free induction decay are also
shown that yield the inverse linewidth parameter T2*. The PE4 has the longest
decay time (T2* = 1.9 ms), Primasheet
 the shortest (T2* = 1.1 ms), while the
simulant has an intermediate value (T2* = 1.7 ms). Extrapolation of the exponential
decays to the time at the end of the excitation pulse provides an estimate of the
relative response of each sample. Since PE4 and simulant samples have identical
presentation geometries, their responses are directly comparable. The simulant has
about 20 % of the response of PE4. This is entirely consistent with the known
concentrations of RDX in each sample, assuming that the intrinsic response of the
entrained RDX in each sample is similar. The lower response of the Primasheet
sample compared to the PE4, despite very similar nominal RDX content, may be
related either to intrinsic variation or to differences in the sample presentation.
A further measurement involved testing for relative T1 between the samples. This
was achieved for each sample by comparing the reduction in signal over a range of s
starting from s = 128 ms down to s = 16 ms. The relative reduction in signal
observed for each sample was the same to within the measurement reproducibility,
thus indicating the same T1 value for each sample. In addition, the chosen NQR
transition frequency for each sample was found to be the same within a few hundred
Hertz, which is the resolution limit imposed by the temperature control in the
experiment (*0.5 K) and the known temperature coefficient [9] for this resonance
(*500 Hz/K). It is likely that the spin dynamics of RDX in each sample is very
similar, but the differences in inhomogeneous broadening observed are related to
the particular crystalline quality imparted by the method of RDX entrainment.
Finally, limitations due to the reduction in response for the simulant should be
considered from an operational point of view. For example, previous initial work
has demonstrated that a maximum handheld probe scanning head speed of 1.5 m/s is
compatible with detection of a 100 g PE4 sample (with similar geometry to the




9.5cmFig. 1 Schematic of the
measurement geometry
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reduction in simulant response implies that a factor of 25 increase in dwell time of
the probe head over the sample is required, or an equivalent maximum scan speed of
0.06 m/s. This is too slow to provide useful real-world testing. However, initial
testing suggests that a closer spacing between the probe head and personnel is
possible (approximately 3 cm). This increases the probe head maximum speed by a
factor of about 5–10, depending on the particular pulse scheme. If it is also practical
to increase the simulant sample volume by a factor of 2–3 compared with the
standard volume of PE4; then, this would allow for rapid probe head scanning
speeds in test work involving simulants. It may therefore be concluded that the
simulant will serve as a safe and suitable substitute for real explosive during NQR
system testing, within the modest restrictions discussed.
It is worthwhile noting that the test work restrictions described above would not
arise in the testing of most other detection methods, where it is expected that
comparable sensitivity to actual explosives would be recovered. Simulants with
higher content of RDX, which would be an advantage to NQR system testing, can
also be prepared if it is assumed that desensitizing is the only requirement of the
added inert materials. However, such simulants would not be suitable for testing
other detection systems, such as X-ray based systems, which are commonly
deployed in existing security checkpoints. Only simulants of the type described in
this paper would be suited to testing systems that employ methods like NQR in
parallel with the common X-ray methods.
5 Conclusion
On the basis of an analysis of a number of explosive detection principles, an RDX
simulant has been prepared that meets the requirements for a wide range of
detection methods. The N, O, C and H elemental composition has been closely
Fig. 2 Free induction decay magnitudes for the three samples, normalized to that of the PE4 sample.
Extrapolation of curves back to t = 0.15 ms yields the relative response
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matched to common RDX-based explosives. Moreover, the 20 % RDX content in
the simulant allows for testing methods such as NQR that have very high specificity
according to electronic coordination. The simulant has been certified as an
inexplosive material. NQR measurements on the simulant demonstrate the existence
of a suitable response with decay characteristics similar to other RDX-based
explosives. The potential use of the simulant for testing a prototype handheld NQR-
based probe has been analyzed. The reduction in NQR sensitivity provided by the
simulant compared to actual explosive material is expected to lead to only modest
changes in the operational testing regime for the prototype. The NQR method
imposes the most stringent limitation in this regard, and it is expected that other
methods would recover normal sensitivity from the simulant in field test work.
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